| Supreme Court of the United States – https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-9192.htm Party name: Humphrey H. Pachecker No.______12-9192_____ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________________________________ Humphrey Humberto Pachecker Petitioner Pro Se vs. The Florida Bar Association Respondents, et al _____________________________ ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: SC10-1896 Lower Tribunal No(s).: 20073084(10) 20073085(10) 20083103(10) 20103022(10) Petitioner Humphrey Humberto Pachecker’s Statement within the Supreme Court of The United States. Verified Statement in Pro Se ________________________________________ Humphrey Humberto Pachecker 1621 Lakeview Drive Sebring, Florida33870 (863) 414-1888 State of Florida County of Highlands Before me this day personally appeared Humphrey Humberto Pachecker (“HHP”) who, being duly sworn deposes and says: A writ of certiorari (“Cert/Petition”) is a formal request for the United States Supreme Court (“USSC”) to review a lower court’s ruling. In this case, (‘my case”) HHP’s petition for write of certiorari filed on March 18, 2013 and placed on the docket on March 12, 2013, as Case Number- 12-9192, requesting review of a ruling from The Florida Supreme Court (“FLASC”) under case number SC10-1896, including lower tribunals, et al. This denial of HHP’s Cert/Petition by the USSC in the FLASC means its decision stands as a final decision. This does not mean that the USSC either agrees or disagrees with the decision of the FLASC, only that the case will no be reviewed. The USSC receives over Five Thousand (5000) Cert/Petitions annually, of those cases, the USSC accept One Hundred (100). The USSC has the discretion to hear only cases they deem appropriate. Constitutionally, those involved in the lawsuit are each entitled to on appeal, which is handled at the district appeals court level which entitlement has not being apply in this case. The USSC denies must Cert/Petitions because the court has no desire to change the interpretation of modern law. The USSC agrees to hear cases that are either novel issues or issues that the court believes require guidance when is not in agreement with the United States Constitution. American Law is based on the principles of precedent, meaning that if a court has already ruled on a given legal issue and another case, as is in my case, arises with the same legal issue, the holding in the previous case shall be applied to the new case, such as must have been in my case. The use of precedents helps to promote stability in our legal system, as all parties are given notice as to the current state of the law. Adhering to the use of precedent complies with the doctrine of stare decisis. Precedents also have a role to play when new legal issues are presented to courts. In my case there are no legal new issues, hence I did look to cases that have been decided in the past supporting my current arguments presented to the FLASC and later to the USSC. Only USSC precedents are binding on all courts. The USSC may decide to hear a case because a State Supreme Court, as it’s in my case, has come to different conclusion on the same legal issued presented as is in my case. The following precedents illustrate my position in accord to our stare decisis court system. In The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So.2d 559, the Supreme Court held that, [T]he firm [law office] and its members, associates or employees properly may conduct the following practice of law:… (e)give legal advice on the law of jurisdictions other than Florida to non-Florida clients in transaction with person residing in Florida or with business enterprises having their principal place of business in Florida; provided that matters of Florida law, if any, are handled by members of The Florida Bar and provided that, if the lawyer giving the legal advice is not a member of The Florida Bar, the lawyer is in Florida on a transitory basis:… In The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412, the Supreme Court held that,… [I]f an activity is the practice of law but the activity is authorized, the activity is not the unlicensed practice of law and may be engaged in by a nonlawyer. In The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591; 373 U.S. 379, the Supreme Court found that setting forth broad definition of the practice of law was “nigh onto impossible.” Federal statutes authorize the federal commission and agency to prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, foreign attorneys, and other persons representing applicants before these federal agencies. One of these federal agencies is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, regulation 8 C.F.R. ss 103.2(a)(3), states that there are three types of individuals authorized to file legal representation as representatives of applicants or petitioners. (1) Attorneys in theUnited States, as defined at 8 C.F.R.ss 292.1(f). (2) Foreign attorneys- outside of the United States, as defined at 8 C.F.R.ss 292.1(a)(6). (3) Accredited representatives, as defined at 8 C.F.R. ss 292.1(a)(4) In my case, I am a foreign attorney with U.S. Law education’s degrees in comparative law and U.S. Immigration law, Federal law of civil procedures, all obtained at local college and university, A.B.A. law school approved. In my case, I am an attorney former partner and firm supervision/administrator of George Chernoff and Associates dba NAFA Attorneys, P.A., a New York attorney by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department, and the USSC, pursuant to an international and interstate partnership agreement following the principles set forth in the case, The Florida Bar v. Savitt, which dealt with a dispute between The Florida Bar and New York lawyers setting up an office in Florida in which the partner assigned to supervise was not admitted to the practice of law in Florida, as is in my case. In my case, is a case involving an interstate – international partnership of the type envisioned in ABA Comm, on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 316 (1967). One of the conclusions of that opinion was that: “The Canons of Ethics do not prohibit a lawyer in State I from entering into an arrangement with a lawyer in State II for the practice of law by which they share in the responsibility and liability of each other, if they indicate the limitations on their practice in a manner consistent with the canons. Subject to the same limitations, offices of the firm could be opened in both states. Of course, only the individuals permitted by the laws of their respective states to practice law here would be permitted to do the acts defined by the state as the practice of law in that state, but there are no ethical barriers to carrying on the practice by such a firm in each state so long as the particular person admitted in that state is the person who, on behalf of the firm, vouched for the work of all of the others and, with the client and in the courts, did the legal acts defined by that state as the practice of law.” Cf. Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla.1978) (presenting a list of prohibited and permitted activities by members of an interstate – international partnership. The scope of my activity as a foreign attorney partner of George Chernoff, a member of the federal count in New York is adjacent to the problem presented in Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963). Federal statutes authorize the Commission of Patents [BIA, Bureau of Immigration Appeal] to prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, foreign attorneys and other persons representing applicants before these federal offices. Sperry, who was a patent agent, recognized by the Commissioner of Patents, maintained an office in Tampa, Florida where he held himself out to be public as practicing patent law. The Supreme Court of Florida enjoined Sperry from engaging in the practice of law, including specific prohibitions against rendering legal opinions as to patentability and infringement, and against holding himself out as qualified to prepare and prosecute applications for letters patent. Applying the Supremacy Clause the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decree “since it prohibits [Sperry] from performing tasks which are incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications before the Patent Office.” In my case the issue defining the degrees of activity in Florida involving an international interstate partnership following the principles established in FLA BAR v Savitt, is if, which will constitute the unauthorized practice of law in Florida by me, a foreign attorney non-admitted in Florida who did maintains a principal office for the practice of law in my jurisdiction of admission in addition to others branches in Florida and in New York compare Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), Cert/Petition denied, 385 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 597, 17 L.Ed.2d 448 (1966) (in banc) (client liable for fees for out of court services rendered over five years period by attorney admitted in California in connection with antitrust case pending in federal court in New York where, if application had been made, California attorney would have been admitted pro hac vice. The scope of my activity as partner of George Chernoff New Yorkattorney is analogous to the issue presented in Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379. The FLASC has ruled, in my case, against its own previous decisions, not only regarding the unauthorized practice of law, status of limitation, discovery procedures and civil procedures, but to my international interstate partnership agreement with a New York attorney. The scope of my activity as a member of a foreign bar submits that the FLASC injunction fails to recognize and excluded from its prohibitions my right to practice federal and non-Florida law. My contention has two aspects, the first prong of the argument rests on George Chernoff’s status as a member of the bar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department, and the USSC. That court, of course, controls whom it will recognize as members of its bar; it is not a matter within the direct control of FLASC or any state court. The decree in my case is not to be interpreted to prohibiting me from appearing before the U.S. Federal Agency for the State of Florida any more than it could be interpreted to prohibit my appearing before the foreign Tribunal of Appeals where I am also admitted. My right to practice before the local federal agencies is not limited to physical presence before the federal court’s judges, magistrates, and BIA Officials [Board of Immigration Appeals]. Respectfully submitted, Humphrey Humberto Pachecker Petitioner Pro Se 1621 Lakeview Drive Sebring,Florida33870 863-414-1888 PROOF OF SERVICE I, Humphrey Humberto Pachecker, do swear or declare that on this dateMay 24,2013, I have served this Verified Statement in Pro Se byUSregular mail to: The names and addresses of those served as are as follows: Ghunise L. Coaxum Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar TheGatewayCenter 1000 Legion Place, Ste. 1625 Orlando,FL32801-5200 C/O John F. Harkness Jr. Executive Director 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee,FL32399-2300 ****** Johnette Hardiman, Chair Standing Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee,FL32399-2300 ****** Lori S. Holcomb Unlicensed Practice of Law Counsel The Florida Bar 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee,FL32399-2300 Sworn and declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct statement. Before me this 24th day of May, 2013, by HUMPHREY H PACHECKER who is personally known to me. HUMPHREY H PACHECKER SEAL — NOTARY PUBLIC Current court’s decision seconding the conviction on my position: FLASC did violate my Due process rights, that is, the legal requirement that the state must respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person. Typically, “Due process” means 1) Notice, generally written, but some courts have determined, in rare circumstances, other types of notice suffice. Notice should provide sufficient detail to fully inform the individual of the decision or activity that will have an effect on his/her rights or property or person. 2) Right to grieve (that being the right to complain or to disagree with the governmental actor/entity that has decision making authority) and 3) the right to appeal if not satisfied with the outcome of the grievance procedure. Due process balances the power of law of the land and protects the individual person from it. When a government harms a person without following the exact course of the law, this constitutes a due-process violation, which offends against the rule of law. The following is a recent ruling supporting my position stated herein, that the scope of my activity as a member of a foreign bar submits that the FLASC injunction fails to recognize and exclude from its prohibitions my right to practice federal and non-Florida law. My contention has two aspects, the first prong of the argument rests on George Chernoff’s status as a member of the bar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department, and the USSC, That court, of course, controls whom it will recognize as members of its bar; it is not a matter within the direct control of FLASC or any state court. The decree in my case is not to be interpreted to prohibiting me from appearing before the U.S. Federal Agency for the State ofFloridaany more than it could be interpreted to prohibit my appearing before the foreign Tribunal of Appeals where I am also admitted. My right to practice before the local federal agencies is not limited to physical presence before the federal court’s judges, magistrates, and BIA Officials [Board of Immigration Appeals]. Saturday, December 20, 2014 By Legal Profession Prof Share The Utah Supreme Court has reversed findings of misconduct, concluding that the accused attorney had been denied due process. A screening panel found that the attorney violated Rules 1.2, 1.4 and 8.4(a). The attorney had not been placed on notice of the alleged Rule 1.2, which violated his due process rights. The court found insufficient evidence of the remaining violations, concluding that the conduct at issue was addressed in Rule 1.1 (competence) rather than Rule 1.4 (communication). The screening panel declined to find a Rule 1.1 violation. The court held that conduct covered by one rule cannot be sanctioned by reference to another rule. (Mike Frisch) | 
